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CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION 
BY THE BACK DOOR 
THE 1983 GEORGE WYTHE LECTURE 
by 
SENATOR THOMAS F. EAGLETON 
Monday, April 4, 1983 
The high regard in which I hold my former colleague, 
your current Dean, is not the only reason why I am very pleased 
to be here. As I examined the list of previous participants 
in the George Wythe Lecture Series, I found them to be very 
interesting and distinguished. An impressive group of legal 
scholars and judges from both the United States and abroad 
have presented ideas on a wide spectrum of important legal 
issues. It is a very laudable tradition befitting the 
r .eputation of the great George Wythe, one of this Law SI..~hool' s 
two namesakes. It is a tradition I dm proud to join by my 
appearance before you this afternoon. 
Having said why I am very pleased to be here this afternoon, 
let me give you a preview of my topic and why I believe it is 
worthy of our collective inquiry. 
I realize that most of the lawyers and lawyers-to-be in 
this room are unlikely to have their law practice or scholarly 
pursuits centrally occupied by constitutional law questions . 
But this remoteness from one ' s daily legal work does not make 
a lawyer remote f rom the Constitution or from the Supreme Court 
which expounds it. After all , we lawyers depend upon a lega l 
system in which the "rule of law" is guaranteed , with stability 
and finality , under established constitutional processes. 
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And, as United States citizens, all of us depend upon the 
Constitution for the very individual freedoms which make 
"life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" possible. 
In that light, I think we should all be very concerned 
that during the 97th Congress, which adjourned in late 1982, 
th~ role of the courts as the expounders and guarantors of 
the Constitution was placed under a growing and ingenious 
attack. As you may know from press reports or other sources, 
over thirty bills were introduced in the last Congress to 
alter the scope and role of the Supreme Court and, in some 
instances, the lower federal courts. The Senate passed one 
measure to limit federal court authority over the subject of 
busing to achieve integration. After extensive debate and 
several relatively close votes, the Senate voted to sidetrack 
Senator Jesse Helms' proposal to strip the courts of jurisdiction 
in school prayer cases. 
Some see the 'much-publicized setback to Senator Helms and 
other supporters of his court-stripping bill as 'the beginning 
of the end for efforts to amend the Constitution through s ·tatute. 
As a vocal opponent of such legislation, I would like this to. 
be the case. However, the court-stripping impulse that t~mpted 
so many members of the preceding Congress reflects both a strong 
opposition to the present trend of federal court decisions and 
a deep-felt (although, in my judgment, profoundly erroneous) 
view about what methods are proper for altering those decisions. 
I have some doubt that we have seen the last serious 
congressional consideration of efforts to reverse court rulings 
by tinkering with court jurisdiction and authority. 
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Indeed, as I make this speech, sometlrreemonths into a new 
Congress, five bills have already been introduced to eliminate 
court jurisdiction over the matters of abortion or school praye r. 
Benchmark for Evaluation of Court-Stripping Proposals: 
The Constitutional Scheme and Tradition 
of a Strong, Inde pendent Judiciary 
My discussion of the proposals to change court decisions 
through simple statute will proceed along two lines. First, 
I will place these proposals in the context of how our 
Cbnstitution came to provide for a strong federal judiciary 
and how that tradition has heen followed -- although not 
without controversy -- in the almost 200 years since the 
. Constitution was ratified. Second, I will discuss how the 
major court-stripping proposals are fundamentally at odds 
with our constitutional scheme and tradition. I will do so 
by breaking the propos a ls into three groups based on the 
different legal questions they would put off limits and the 
differing legal and policy questions they raise. 
The Constitution as a Reaction 
to the Articles of Confederation 
Frankly , if th e court- s tripping propos a l s I am discussing 
here today were not s o pote ntially poisonous to our constitutional 
s ch e me , I would b e g l a d they came before the Se n a t e . I say that 
be c a u se the n ee d to unde r s tand and articulate jus t how at odds 
the se proposals are with our constitutional syste m a nd tra dit i on 
l e d me to s tudy the Cons titution's hi s torica l a n te ce de nts . 
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Specifically, I devoted significant attention to a period that 
is the least evaluated and most ignored period of our nation's 
history: the Articles of Confederation period from 1781 to 1789. 
My s tudy convince d me that this time frame is perh a ps the most 
important period of our nation's history for understanding the 
origins of the Constitution. 
Under the Articles o f Confederation, our nation was a league 
of disunite d States , whose representatives met from time to time 
to deal with a very limited range of common concerns in a system 
that relied almost entirely on voluntary cooperation. The 
government under the Articles of Confederation was a dismal 
failure. We are in the "last stage of national humiliation," 
wrote Hamilton in Federalist No. 15. Agreements broken, debts 
unpaid, credit dried up, commerce stagnated, territory violated, 
remonstrances scorned -- all of this was the disorder of the day. 
Our national governme ntal non-structure was, according to 
historian Herbert J. Storing, a "dark catalogue of public mis fortunes." 
Perhaps the weakest of the weak governmenta l links under the 
Articles of Confede ration was the court system. Whe n the courts 
functioned, they functioned in a piecemeal, haphazard way. 
Sometimes they didn't function at all, as during "Shays' Rebe lllC'!1 " 
in Mass achuse t t s in 1786, whe n disciples of Shays time and again 
crowde d a round th e courthouses and kept the courts from proce s s ing 
d e bt cl a ims. Thomas J effers o n, awa y in France on a mb assadori a l 
assignme nt, was not pa rticularly worried about "Sha y s ' Reb e llion" 
exc ept in sof ar as t h e p rinc i pa l mani fes t a t ion s of di sconte nt were 
"the at t e mpts t o interfe r e with th e orderly process o f the cou r t s ." 
Th e d es i gn e r s of the Consti tution would not forge t t his experi ence 
wi t h powerless courts . 
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The Founders' Clear Choice of a 
Strong National Government and Court 
Washington, Adams, Jay, Hamilton, Madison and, later in 
the process, Jefferson concluded that a much stronger governmental 
structure was necessary to avoid the chaos, paralysis and disunion 
of :- the day. As the antidote to creeping anarchy, the Costitution 
wa s born with strong powers in a truly national government. An 
integral part of national sovereignty established by the 
Constitution was a national court. The national judicial power 
was "vested in one supreme court." James Madison and Alexander 
., " " 
Hamilton, the gui.i ng geniuses of Federalism, were clear on the 
. ~ . . 
link between a stro~~~ independent Supreme Court and the 
preservation of the Constitution against future inroads. 
The Founding Fathers clearly realized that they would put 
the basic survival of the Constitution in jeopardy if they 
did not provide a strong and independent judicial power. They 
understood that, to quote Hamilton (in Federalist No. 22), 
"Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and define 
their true meaning and operation." And, fearing a legislature 
whic;h, to quote Madison (in Federalist No. 48), was "everywhere 
e xt~nding the sphere of its activity and drawing all powe r into 
its impetuous vortex," the Founders ensured an independe nt 
" 'judiciary. 
Not that the Founde rs cre ated an "impe ri a l judiciary." 
The y provided for impeachment of judges for cause . The y 
sanctioned a constitutional ame ndment process for ch a n ging the 
meaning o f th e Cons titution. (Of the 26 amendments t o th e 
Constitution, four have ove rturned Supreme Cou~t opinions.) 
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Yet, the Founders obviously intended that interferences 
with court processes and rulings would be rare and difficult 
to achieve. Only in this way could they guarantee that the 
federal courts could continue, as Justice Black later put it, 
to "stand against any winds that blow as havens of refuge for 
tho~~ who ... are victims of prejudice and public excitement." 
A History of Controversy About the Court 
The historical record since ratification of the Constitution 
proves that the Founders were quite savvy, in addition to being 
brilliant . . For, strong winds, to use Justice Black's metaphor, 
have frequently blown around the federal courts, as they sought 
to protect the individual rights and liberties embedded in the 
constitutional compact. 
Throughout his remarkable 34-year tenure as Chief Justice, 
John Marshall was in a running battle with Presidents, Congress, 
and State Governors as he asserted the judicial supremacy of the 
Supreme Court. President Jefferson so violently opposed Marsha ll 
and:'his rampant Federalism that he even contemplated the 
impeachment of the Chief Justice. 
In the pre-Civil War years, there was intense and, at times, 
vitriolic debate by Abolitionists in and out of Congress directed 
at the Taney Court. 
Early in the 20th century, progressives in Congress and 
President Theodore Roosevelt castigated what they viewed to be 
a reactionary Supreme Court. Moves were initiated to restrict 
the Supreme Court and to establish a method of recall of federal 
judges. 
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Getting closer to the present, we can recall the billboards 
and bumper stickers in the '50s and '60s stating, "Impeach 
Earl Warren." 
So, criticizing and disputing the Court and its decision~ 
is as old as the Republic itself and, presumably, "as American 
as apple pie." Fortunately, however, we have never let our 
outrage at particular court actions lead us to place at risk 
the fundamental authority and independence of our courts. 
The Dangerous Nature of the 
Present Attack on Court Authority 
Undoubtedly, the recent rash of anti-court legislative 
proposals draws some inspiration. from our custom of criticizing 
the federal judiciary. However, I want to begin my discussion 
of the specific court-stripping proposals by observing how their 
attack differs in important ways from the attack of their 
, predecessors. 
First, while previous attacks were primarily directed at 
individual judges and the philosophical composition of the Court, 
the present drive against the courts has been .launched on the 
\ . 
arcane, legally technlcal battlefield of court jurisdiction and 
congressional remedial power . This means that whi .le previous 
attacks , for th e most part, lacked any serious constitutional 
cover, today' s court-stripping proposals seemingly come clothed 
in the very language of the Constitution. (As I will indicate , 
current proposals rest on Congress' power to regulate federal 
judicial power or to enforce several constitutional amendments 
through "appropriate legislation.") 
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The present attacks on the Court also differ from previous 
ones in terms of the breadth of the damage they would do to our 
constitutional system. 
It is true that p r eviously considered attacks on particular 
judges or courts, if they had been successful, would have 
significantly harme d judicial independence and created a bad 
precedent. However, inherent in the present court-stripping 
proposals is the theory that Congress can amend what the Supreme 
Court has found to be the meaning of the Constitution merely 
by passing a statute of one form or another. Therefore, if 
sanctioned and carried to their ultimate logic, the current 
proposals would s ubj e ct an unlimited unive rse of constitutional 
issue s to quick, legislative nullification. Every judge and 
every court would face case-by-case reversal, whenever a 
transitory majority in the Congress could be mustered to pass 
a court-stripping statute . 
Let me now discus s the three basic types of proposal s 
by which some in Congre s s s e ek to amend the Constitution by 
the back door. As I mentioned, although the three types share 
a common theory, they a r e constitutionally dangerous f or somewhat 
di f fere nt r e asons . 
Prayer in School s 
Unti l Pr es i dent Reagan' s a nnounce d support f o r 
a proposa l t o a mend t h e Constitution with re spe ct to s chool 
p ray e r, th e f ront -running proposal to overturn Supre me Cou~t 
dec i sion s in this a r ea was tha t o f Se n a tor He lms . The He lms b i l l , 
o ffere d last Fall as an amendment to the fede ral debt ce iling 
r esolution, would have taken away the jurisdiction of the Suprerre Court 
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and other federal courts to hear cases relating to prayer 
in schools. 
Senator Helms' proposal did not purport, nor could he 
have purported, to alter the jurisdiction of the state courts 
to hear cases involving school prayer and the First Amendment; 
state courts would be left as forums of last resort in school 
prayer cases. However, the proposal clearly banked on state 
courts being less than zealous in discharging their duty to 
: "protect and defend the Constitution" by enforcing the spirit 
and letter of current Supreme Court , decrees. As Senator Helms 
made clear in 1981, he and his supporters expected adjudication 
of school prayer cases in state, not federal court to "restore 
to the American people the fundamental right of voluntary prayer 
in the public schools," current law notwithstanding. 
The constitutional infirmity of the Helms legislation seems 
straightforward. The proposal aims by mere statute to change 
the Constitution's guarantees against establishment of religion, 
as authoritatively interpreted by the courts, exercising a role 
which dates from Marbury v. Madison. This runs headlong into 
the Framers' intent that the Constitution be changeable only 
through the constitutional amendment process. Specifically, 
statutory amendment of the Constitution would run afoul of 
a caution sounded by Alexander Hamilton almost two centuries 
~ 
a'g'd: that the Constitution should not be revised by "the 
representatives of the people, whenever a momentary inclination 
happens to lay hold of a majority of the ir constituents, 
incompatible with the provisions in the exis ,ting Consti tution ... " 
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Despite all this, there is a swath of textual material which 
seems on first inspection to provide constitutional cover for 
proposals such as the Helms bill. Article III, Section 2 of the 
Constitution gives the Congress power to make "exceptions" and 
"regulations" to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 
Proponents of the Helms approach, including Senator Helms himself, 
have characterized removal of jurisdiction over certain constitutional 
cases as an "exception" or "regulation" permitted by Article III. 
Beyond the words of the Constitution, they point to jurisdiction-
limiting statutes in non-constitutional settings and an 1869 case 
in which the Supreme Court approved a restriction on its 
jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases. 
Whatever the surface appeal of these arguments, I believe, 
with many legal scholars, that reliance on the ~xceptions and 
regulations clause for bills such as the Helms' school p r ayer 
bill, is misplaced. The Exceptions Clause must be read in its 
~ broader constitutional context, and against the backdrop of the 
.,' ~I • I 
" 
Constitutional Convention debates. 
Viewed in that light, it is very doubtful that the Founders 
intended congress' power over appellate jurisdiction to be a 
lice nse to circumvent the constitutional independence of the 
Supre me Court a nd th e s ol e means which the Constitution prescribes 
for its amendme nt. As r espect ed legal s chola r He nry Hart put it: 
"Why, wh a t mo nstro u s illogic! To build up a me r e powe r to r egul a t e 
jurisdictio n into a p ower t o affe ct r ight s having nothing to d o 
with juris diction! And [to s ay this] in contradictio n to a ll t h e 
other t e rms o f the v e ry document which confe rs the powe r to 
regul a t e jurisdiction!" 
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Or as the present Attorney General of the United States 
concluded in an extensively-documented letter to the Chairman 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee: "There is no doubt that 
Congress possesses some power to regulate the app e llate jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court .... Congress may not, however, consistent 
with the Constitution, make "exceptions" to Supreme Court 
jurisdiction which would intrude upon the core functions of the . 
Supreme Court as an independent and equal branch in our system 
of separation of powers." 
Abortion 
The subject of abortion has prompted several jurisdiction-
limiting bills along the lines of the Helms school prayer bill. 
In addition, however, the effort to reverse Supreme Court cases 
on the legality of abortion has led to a diffe rent proposal for 
amending the Constitution by the back door. I refer to Senator 
Helms' bill, which, in t he version reported by a Subcommittee 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, would have Congress by statute 
de fin e the word "pe r s on" in t h e Fourteenth Ame ndment t hus : "Th e 
Congre ss hereby r e cognize s tha t for the purpose of enforcing the 
obliga tion of the States und e r the Fourteenth Amendme nt not to 
deprive p e rsons o f life without due proces s of law, each human 
li fe exi s t s from co nception ... " 
Ma ny peop l e , myse lf include d, h a v e been highly crit i ca l o f the 
Supreme c ourt' s 197 3 a bortion dec i s ions, a nd we s eek t o recti f y 
t h ose deci sions by the t r aditiona l cons t i tut i ona l a me ndme nt r oute . 
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However, many abortion decision critics, again including me, 
regard the Helms human life-defining approach as of very dubious 
constitutionality. 
Indeed, as with the school prayer bills, the Helms approach 
to overturning abortion decisions by statute seems on its face 
to subvert the fundamental attributes of the judicial power the 
Founders ordained. The power to define is the power to expound. 
Under our Constitution, that power .is vested in the Supreme Court, 
not the Congress. To impute to Congress the power to reverse 
abortion cases by the simple expedient of writing a statutory 
definition of "person" would be to impute the right of Congress 
to reverse through redefinition other portions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as well -- . including the terms "due process," "equal 
protection," and some of the other bedrock rights, such as freedom 
of the press and speech, which have been applied to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. To permit a transitory, 
political majority in Congress to rewrite the Constitution by 
statute is to begin the destruction of the Constitution itself. 
Yet, the situation is not quite as simple as it might seem. 
The Helms abortion bill is similar to the school prayer bills 
in another respect: a constitutional provision and an expansively-
written Supreme Court decision blur what would otherwise be, to 
my eyes , a clear picture of unconstitutionality. 
Thus, proponents of the supposed power of Congress to 
redefine by statute t he Fourteenth Amendment point to its 
Section 5. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment states that, 
"The Congress shall have power to enforce , by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this [Amendment]." 
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In Katzenbach v. M::)rgan, the Supreme Court construed Section 5 to 
permit Congress to prohibit certain state voting laws as 
discriminatory -- notwithstanding the Court's previous ruling 
that the laws did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
Although Section 5 and Morgan give this argument a semblance 
.of constitutional validity, on closer analysis, the semblance is 
more imaginary than real. The Morgan Court sought to avoid any 
general conclusion that Congress may displace the Court as 
expounder of Fourteenth Amendment rights. Subsequent cases 
buttress that caution. For example, Oregon v. Mitchell struck 
down a legislative conclusion that the 18-year-old vote was 
n e cessary to provide equal prot e ction under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. A majority of the Court joined separate opinions 
assuming that the Court's, not Congress', interpretation of 
Equal Protection should govern. 
There is little in current case law or logic to justify 
a congressional reversal of .basic Supreme Court enumerations 
of the rights embe dded in the Fourteenth Amendment. 
School Busing 
The congressional approach to school busing, as spearheaded 
., by Senators He lms and Johnston, involves s ome of the que stions 
1~~ , 
already discus sed, but also brings a n ew and ver y di s turbing 
dime n s ion to the c urre nt court- s tripping efforts . The He lms -
Johnston restrictions, as pass e d in the last Congre ss, would 
de ny to th e fede r a l courts the right to. impose a busing remedy 
r equiring travel b e yond fift e en minutes from a stude nt' s home . 
', ', 
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To the extent that the bill would restrict the ability of 
the Supreme court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction over 
school desegration cases involving busing remedies -- and there 
is some dispute among those who have studied the amendment 
about wh~ther it would do this -- it would have to be justified 
as either a "regulation" of Supreme court jurisdiction or an 
exercise of congress' remedial power to enforce constitutional 
amendments. For the reasons discussed previously, either 
justification should be judged severely wanting. 
However, as they would apply to the lower federal courts, 
the Helms-Johnston restrictions seek justification in another, 
quite different source. Thus, because Congress has the discretion 
under Article III to create the lower federal courts, some argue 
that it therefore has the power to define or limit the remedies 
that a lower federal court may impose. 
It is true that efforts to restrict lower court actions stand 
on a different footing from efforts to restrict the Supreme Court. 
However, it is even more true that hobbling the judiciary by 
denying it the remedy necessary to vindicate a constitutional 
right may well be the same as nullifying the constitutional right 
itself. In cons titutional terms, denial of adequate remedial 
power would be invalid as an impermissible congr essional interf~rencE 
with the essentials of the independent judicial function. Or, it 
could we ll b e a violation of constitutional provisions outside of th E 
Article III power (such as, due process), which constrain 
legislative action. 
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In the very practical terms of the Helms-Johnston amendment 
~s it passed the Senate, Congress, by statute, is saying to an 
~ggrieved minori t y student that there is a 15-minute "shot clock" 
~n your Equal Protection right. The lower federal courts can 
~rovide you a reme dy f or up to 15 minutes; beyond that, "Sorry, 
\ . " ~oulre on your own. 
, 
Conclusion 
Hear these moving words from a legislative report: 
"Manifestly, if we may force the hand of the Court to secure 
~ur interpretation of the Constitution, then some succe e ding 
~ongress may repeat the process to secure another and a different 
~nterpretation and one which may not sound so pleasant in our ears 
~ s that for which we now contend. 
"It is e s sential to the continuance of our constitutional 
Ciemocracy that the judiciary be completely indepe ndent of both 
t h e e xecutive and legi slative branches of the Government, and 
we a s sert that inde pendent cour ts are the last safeguard of the 
citizen, where h i s rights come in conflict with the power of 
governmental agencies." 
Thus spok e t h e Sen a t e Judici ary Committe e in 1937 when 
liberal Fr anklin Roosev e l t s ought to r e -write cons e rva tive 
Sup r e me Cour t opi nio n s by th e inge nious stra t egem of "pa cking" 
t h e Court with appointees of his own choos ing . Today, 46 year s 
l a t e r, d is s a ti s f ied cons erv a tive s want to re-wr ite l i b era l 
Supr e me Court op i nio n s by e qually inge nious strategems o f 
re -writi ng the Co ns ti t ution by s t a tute or by procedur a l a rt ifi c e . 
In s hort, the y want to a me nd the Constitution by the back door. 
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The 1937 words of the Senate Judiciary Committee are 
" 
.1 • 
just as applicable today. What can be manipulated by today's 
political majority can be just as easily manipulated by 
tomorrow's -- and to other ends. 
In a very real sense, the choice befor~ the Congress and 
the country is whether we want a Constitution according to 
Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall, or a Constitution according 
to Jesse Helms. To me, the choice is abundantly clear. 
